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Abstract Researchers in the cognitive sciences often seek neural correlates of psycho-
logical constructs. In this paper, I argue that even when these correlates are discovered,
they do not always lead to reductive outcomes. To this end, I examine the psycholog-
ical construct of a critical period and briefly describe research identifying its neural
correlates. Although the critical period is correlated with certain neural mechanisms,
this does not imply that there is a reductionist relationship between this psycholog-
ical construct and its neural correlates. Instead, this case study suggests that there
may be many-to-many psychological-neural mappings, not just one-to-one or even
one-to-many relations between psychological kinds and types of neural mechanisms.
Keywords Reductionism · Natural kinds · Neural correlates · Multiple realizability ·
Taxonomy
1 Introduction
Recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science include a resur-
gence of work on the topic of reductionism (Kim 1998; Bickle 2003; Shapiro 2004)
and a growing interest in mechanisms and mechanistic explanation, especially in
neuroscience (Craver 2008; Bechtel 2009; Piccinini and Craver 2011). These two
developments raise the question as to whether the discovery of mechanisms and mech-
anistic explanations is conducive to reductionism and whether there is a one-to-one
relationship between psychological kinds and neural mechanisms. In this paper, I will
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argue that despite the fact that neural mechanisms are often correlated with psycholog-
ical processes, states, and functions, these correlations do not always yield reductive
outcomes. In Sect. 2, I will introduce the psychological construct of a critical period,
a stage during which an organism is particularly sensitive to inputs of certain types,
and will briefly describe research identifying some of its neural correlates. Then, in
Sect. 3, I will argue that despite the fact that the critical period is correlated with
certain neural mechanisms, there may be a many-to-many relationship between this
psychological construct and its neural correlates. Finally, in Sect. 4, I will bring up var-
ious objections and will respond to them. The overall aim will be to argue that there
can be many-to-many psychological-neural mappings, not just one-to-one or even
one-to-many relations between psychological kinds and types of neural mechanisms.
2 Neural correlates and the critical period
Neural correlates are not a philosophical pipe dream; they are widely sought in recent
work in cognitive neuroscience. Researchers attempt to find neural correlates of: fear,
envy, memory consolidation, and consciousness, among many others.1 In recent years,
widespread connections have been discovered between cognitive-behavioral cate-
gories and neuroscientific constructs. The search for neural correlates is often tied
to a “localization strategy,” a research program that posits that activation in a neural
structure is “maximally sensitive” or “selective” for a specific psychological func-
tion. This posit is what enables the practice of “reverse inference” in neuroscience,
which concludes that a particular psychological function is engaged on the grounds
that a certain neural structure is activated (Poldrack 2006). To be sure, localization
can allow that there can be more than one neural correlate for any given psychological
function, in other words, that co-activation of multiple structures is necessary for the
implementation of a certain psychological function. But what localization does not
appear to allow is the possibility that activation in a particular neural structure may
correspond to an entirely distinct psychological function on different occasions or in
different contexts. Thus, the search for neural correlates is typically associated with
a reductionist strategy, according to which neural structures and mechanisms are spe-
cialized for specific psychological functions, either singly or in conjunction with other
neural structures. Opposed to this research strategy is one that is sometimes labeled
“contextualism” or “constructionism” (Lindquist et al. 2012), which holds that activa-
tion in a neural structure may correlate with one psychological function in one context
while being correlated with a completely different function in another. The context in
question is usually thought to be the neural context, so that activation in some neural
structure N1 may correspond to psychological function P1 in conjunction with activa-
tion in another neural structure N2, but to some entirely distinct psychological function
P2 in conjunction with activation in a third neural structure N3. Moreover, there need
be no distinct psychological function that corresponds to the contribution of N1 in
particular. For example, according to what Anderson (2010, p. 246) terms the “neural
1 For fear, see LeDoux (1998); for envy, see Takahashi et al. (2009); for memory consolidation, see Shad-
mehr and Holcomb (1997); for consciousness, see Rees et al. (2002).
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reuse” hypothesis, “low-level neural circuits are used and reused for various purposes
in different cognitive and task domains.” However, a variant that is not sufficiently
explored is the possibility that the non-neural context also plays a role in determining
which psychological function is performed by a particular neural structure or mech-
anism. In this paper, I will try to make the case that a particular neural mechanism
can be correlated with different psychological functions in different non-neural con-
texts. Not only can there be distinct neural correlates for some psychological functions
in different systems (as in multiple realization), the same neural correlate can corre-
spond to different psychological functions depending on its relationship to the broader
(neural and) non-neural context. Hence, I will conclude that this situation leads to a
many-to-one mapping between psychological functions and neural structures, not just
a one-to-many mapping (as in multiple realization), and that such a mapping blocks
familiar forms of reductionism such as the localization strategy.
To make this case, I will look at research on the psychological category of the critical
period. Critical periods have been the focus of work by neuroscientists, developmental
psychologists, cognitive ethologists, psycholinguists, and others for well over half a
century.2 There is widespread agreement that a critical period is a relatively brief, well-
defined phase in the early part of an organism’s lifespan, in which a particular type of
input has a strong influence and is vital for the acquisition of a certain perceptual or
cognitive capacity. Outside of this critical period, acquisition is either impossible or
more difficult and prolonged. To distinguish the former case from the latter, sometimes
a distinction is made between a critical period and a sensitive period, respectively, but I
will be using critical period as a blanket term for both phenomena. Critical periods have
been observed for a range of perceptual-cognitive capacities, including song learning
in birds (George et al. 1995), auditory localization in barn owls (Knudsen and Knud-
sen 1990), whisker representations in the mouse barrel cortex (Erzurumlu and Gaspar
2012), and human language acquisition (Grimshaw et al. 1998). In animal models,
evidence for the critical period is often obtained from experiments in which individual
organisms are deprived of a certain type of stimulus during a developmental phase.
They are then compared with controls that have not been subject to deprivation during
that phase. If the controls have acquired a capacity that the deprived individuals cannot
acquire (or cannot acquire without considerable additional effort), this is taken as evi-
dence that the capacity is subject to a critical period (e.g. Knudsen and Knudsen 1990).
Critical periods can vary along several dimensions. First, some critical periods begin
at or directly after birth while others take place later, even in adolescence. Second,
some perceptual and cognitive capacities feature a single critical period while others
are characterized by a series of interdependent periods. Third, in some cases there
is a sharp cutoff, while in others there is a gradual decrease in the ability to acquire
the cognitive capacity (this distinction is not the same as the one drawn between a
critical period and a sensitive period, mentioned above). Fourth, the critical period is
sometimes dependent on a very specific type of stimulus while in others it is more
generic.
2 Lorenz (1937) seems to have borrowed the term “critical period” from embryology to describe the
phenomenon of imprinting. See also Michel and Tyler (2005) and Bateson and Hinde (1987) for brief
historical surveys of empirical work.
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One of the earliest research programs on critical periods concerned the visual system
in various species of mammals, including mice, rats, cats, and monkeys. Cats with one
eye surgically covered from birth up to several weeks after birth never develop normal
vision in the covered eye once it is reopened, even after many years have passed.
By contrast, when the same experiment is repeated with adult cats, even when one
eye is covered for a year, normal vision in that eye is restored after it is reopened
(Hubel and Wiesel 1970). As one researcher puts it, “the seemingly innocuous act
of covering an eye can profoundly alter the physical structure of the brain during the
critical period only” (Hensch 2005, p. 877). This simple act affects the development of
ocular dominance (OD) columns, patterns of neurons in the primary visual cortex (area
V1). As numerous studies have demonstrated, the neural wiring of the OD columns is
altered in these experiments such that the columns serving the open eye expand and
acquire greater connectivity at the expense of the columns that normally respond to
the covered eye.
Recent research has looked more closely at the cellular and molecular processes
involved in closing the “window” that marks the ending of the critical period. One
common mechanism for achieving this in several species involves the secretion of
proteoglycan molecules (sticky sugar-protein hybrids), which condense into a tight
net around the dendrites and cell bodies of some of the neurons in the OD columns,
impeding axons from moving (Hensch 2003, p. 20). Once these molecules condense
around neurons in the extra-cellular matrix (ECM), neuronal connectivity is impaired.
After the net of proteoglycan molecules tightens around the neurons that normally
serve the covered eye, the neurons can no longer form new connections or develop in
response to sensory input. The timing of the production of the proteoglycan molecules
is under the control of the expression of certain genes, and this process is sensitive to
developmental phases in ontogeny. It is also known that these proteoglycan molecules
can be dissolved with chondroitinase-ABC enzyme, which has been used to extend
the critical period in some animal models (Pizzorusso et al. 2002).
This explanation of the closure of the critical period would seem to conform closely
to the ideals of mechanistic explanation. Although there are untold complexities in the
process sketched in the previous paragraph, the explanation clearly refers to “entities
and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or
set-up to finish or termination conditions” (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3). The entities
include molecules, cells, and parts of cells (e.g. axons, dendrites), and the activities can
be described (albeit in a simplified fashion) in terms of verbs like secrete, condense,
adhere, impede, dissolve, and so on. An account of this mechanism provides a satis-
fying explanation for the fact that (for example) cats that have one eye covered from
birth to several weeks of age never fully recover from this impairment and that the
covered eye is unable to regain normal vision even after it is uncovered. It would seem
as though we have supplied a neural correlate for the closure of the critical period and
that the cognitive or psychological construct of a critical period is a good candidate
for reduction to a neural process.
One complication is that there is also evidence to suggest that in some instances, dif-
ferent neural processes can achieve the same result in different species or for different
cognitive and perceptual capacities. As a recent review article states: “The mecha-
nisms underlying the control of critical periods are most likely complex and diverse”
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(Levelt and Hübener 2012, p. 311). Indeed, they cite evidence that another mechanism
for closure of the critical period has to do with synaptic changes in certain inhibitory
neurons, specifically functional changes in the speed of inhibitory synapses (Levelt
and Hübener 2012, p. 318). Similarly, Hensch (2004, p. 552), refers to “a diversity
of molecular mechanisms across systems or even at various stages along the same
pathway.” Although research on this issue is ongoing, it is not difficult to envision
different types of cellular and molecular mechanisms that might lead to a decline in
neural plasticity under the control of genetic and epigenetic processes that are sensitive
to ontogeny. Before concluding that there is a single neural mechanism responsible for
the closure of all critical periods, we will need to look at a range of critical periods in
different species and across cognitive and perceptual capacities to determine whether
they are all served by the same neural mechanism. To put it in familiar philosophical
terms, we need to ascertain whether the critical period is multiply realized relative to
neural mechanisms. Rather than a one-to-one reduction of the closure of the critical
period to a neural mechanism, preliminary evidence indicates that the relationship is
one-to-many.
If it turns out that there are indeed a variety of cellular-molecular mechanisms that
subserve the closure of the critical period, there are at least three responses that reduc-
tionists can make to such cases of putative multiple realization. The first should be
familiar from the philosophical literature on reductionism (e.g. Kim 1998). It states
that the existence of multiple neural mechanisms corresponding to critical periods
does not threaten reductionism, since we can still achieve a limited or local reduction,
say to different species or different capacities within species. What we know about
natural selection suggests that we will not typically find different neural correlates
when it comes to a single capacity within a single species (though polymorphisms do
exist within species), but it is not as implausible across species or lineages. However, if
we discovered a local reduction of this sort, we would still need to understand why dif-
ferent reducing bases all correspond to critical periods. Assuming that lumping them
together is justified, we would still need the psychological characterization of critical
periods in order to recognize that we have different neural mechanisms for accom-
plishing the same cognitive and developmental function. Hence, a local reduction
does not negate the need for a psychological kind and does not render it dispensable.
It just equates a unitary psychological kind with a disjunction of neural ones (which
is not, in general, a unitary neural kind, since the class of natural kinds is not closed
under disjunction). A local reduction of this kind is sometimes also characterized as
a functional reduction, since the same psychological role or function is performed by
different neural occupants. But that presupposes that there is a single psychological
function that these diverse neural states are performing (cf. Khalidi 2005).
The second response goes further than the first in that it denies that the posited
multiple mechanisms that correspond to the closure of the critical period are instances
of the very same phenomenon even at the psychological level. (Notice that it would be
misleading to say that these neural mechanisms correspond to subkinds of a superor-
dinate psychological kind, critical period, since the existence of such a superordinate
kind is just what is being denied by this response.) The reductionist could argue that
despite certain superficial similarities the neural differences do not result in signifi-
cant psychological commonalities, and that lumping them together is not legitimate.
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Rather, the psychological construct may be a folk category that will be superseded by
scientific research (cf. Kim 1998; Shapiro 2004). The success of this move can only be
settled by determining whether scientists who investigate the perceptual and cognitive
capacities of organisms are justified in viewing all critical periods as members of a
single kind, despite the multiplicity of neural mechanisms that underlie them. It is cer-
tainly conceivable that these mechanisms will eventually be regarded as being grouped
together without warrant. However, though important differences obtain in terms of
molecular and cellular implementation, one can abstract away from them for many
cognitive and behavioral purposes, yielding one psychological kind that corresponds
to various neural kinds. That is because there are weighty scientific considerations
from cognitive ethology and evolutionary biology that justify lumping together dif-
ferent instances of the critical period. Many perceptual and cognitive capacities are
subject to such a developmental phase, particularly those that must be acquired rapidly
and early in life for the sake of the organism’s survival, and the similarities among
them are explanatorily significant. For example, some researchers have pursued paral-
lels and investigated commonalities among the critical period for language learning in
humans and the critical periods for other psychological capacities in other species (see
e.g. Newport et al. 2001). The critical period cannot be dismissed as a folk category
that picks out certain phenomenological or semantic features of interest for certain
practical purposes but lacking in scientific credentials (I will return to this reductionist
response in Sect. 4).
The third reductionist response is the opposite of the second. Instead of saying that
the psychological kind ought to be split, it suggests that the neural kinds should be
lumped.3 It consists in saying that the allegedly diverse neural correlates of a unitary
psychological kind must have something in common at the neural level, after all. Even
if we were to discover different neural mechanisms for a critical period in species
S1 for capacity C1 and in species S2 for capacity C2, a reductionist could insist that
there is a commonality at the neural level that abstracts away from the messy details
of molecular and cellular implementation. In this case, it may be maintained that they
share something like a decline in neural plasticity or a decrease in neural connectivity.
However, against this response, it may be conceded that there is a sense in which there
is a common neural denominator in these cases, but it could also be maintained that
the phenomenon of a decline in neural plasticity is underspecified. Perhaps it could
be made more precise and be of use in neuroscientific theorizing. However, as I will
argue in the next section, any attempt to add further precision to this construct will
encounter two problems that make it doubtful that the central features of a critical
period could be captured in neuroscientific terms.
3 Much of the recent debate concerning multiple realization has revolved around the issue of whether the
neural or biological realizers of allegedly multiply realized psychological kinds are indeed “relevantly”
different, or whether the psychological kinds themselves are “relevantly” the same. Opponents of multiple
realization cast doubt on the claim that the psychological kinds have relevantly different realizers at the
neural level (e.g. Bechtel and Mundale 1999; Shapiro 2004; Polger 2009). Meanwhile, proponents of
multiple realization reply by producing cases in which the realizers are indeed relevantly different (e.g.
Aizawa and Gillett 2009; Weiskopf 2011).
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3 One-to-many or many-to-many?
There are two reasons for thinking that there are inherent obstacles to characterizing
the phenomenon of the critical period entirely in neural terms. The first obstacle arises
from the fact that the neural mechanism described in the previous section corresponds
not to the critical period as such but to the closure of the critical period. While the
critical period is a developmental phase in the life of the organism, the closure of the
critical period marks the endpoint of that phase. Discovering a neural correlate for
the closure of the critical period is not the same as finding one for the critical period
itself. Still, it may be said that if one also finds the neural correlate for the onset of the
critical period (the search for which is an active and productive research program in its
own right), then one could identify the critical period as the interval of time between
these two types of neural process. But characterizing the endpoints of a process in
neural terms is different from characterizing the process itself in neural terms. These
two neural correlates would still not correspond to the critical period itself and we
would not thereby have given that developmental phase a neural description.4 It may
be objected here that a developmental phase is not a likely candidate for reduction,
since it denotes a period in the life of an organism (or rather, a type of period in a type
of organism), rather than an entity, mechanism, or even a process. But that is part of
the point: some types of psychological construct do not seem to correspond neatly to
the types of things commonly individuated in the neurosciences.
But there is a second, more serious, problem with the effort to capture all and
only critical periods in neural terms. The neural mechanism described in the previous
section would only correspond to the closure of a critical period if it were to be active
relatively early in ontogeny. The critical period is defined relative to the organism’s
lifespan. If the decline in neural plasticity occurs towards the end of life, it would not
be considered the closure of a critical period, but perhaps the onset of dementia or
some other psychological phenomenon. Indeed, a search of the literature indicates that
there is some evidence of a connection between Alzheimer’s disease and the build-up
of proteoglycans in the extracellular matrix: “PGs [proteoglycans] possess diverse
physiological roles, particularly in neural development, and are also implicated in the
pathogenesis of neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease (AD)” (Cui
et al. 2013). Moreover, not only is the critical period defined in relation to the lifespan
of the individual, it may also be individuated in relation to the history of the species.
A developmental change corresponding to the closure of a critical period may not be
considered such unless it has the right evolutionary history, that is unless it has evolved
to fulfill a particular purpose. Hence, the critical period, its onset, and closure, are at
least partly a matter of the environmental and etiological context.
This second obstacle to reduction implies that rather than a one-to-many psycho-
neural relation, we have a many-to-many relationship. The very same type of neural
4 A similar situation seems to arise in other instances of purported psycho-neural reductions, whereby what
is reduced to neuroscience is a limiting case or boundary condition of a certain psychological phenomenon
rather than the phenomenon itself. Compare Sullivan (2008, p. 509) on the alleged reduction of memory
consolidation to the neural mechanism of long-term potentiation (LTP): memory consolidation initiation
has been reduced to neural level, not memory consolidation.
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Fig. 1 In the top diagram, there
is a one-to-many relationship
(multiple realization) between a
psychological kind (1) and a
number of neural kinds (1, 2,
3), whereas in the bottom
diagram, there is also a
many-to-many relationship
(crosscutting) between
psychological kinds (1, 2)
and neural kinds (1, 2, 3)
mechanism that corresponds to the closure of the critical period relative to the lifespan
of one type of organism and in one evolutionary setting may correspond to a differ-
ent type of psychological phenomenon in different circumstances. Not only is there
empirical evidence that the closure of the critical period is subserved by a diverse
set of neural mechanisms, the neural mechanism that is correlated with the closure
of the critical period in one ontogenetic and phylogenetic context may be correlated
with another psychological process (e.g. the onset of dementia) in a different con-
text. Instead of a one-to-many relationship between the psychological and the neural,
there is a many-to-many relationship. In other words, the relationship is not just one
of multiple realization but of crosscutting (see Fig. 1). This seems to preclude even
weak varieties of reductionism, since a many-to-many relationship prevents a local or
functional reduction of the type discussed in the previous section. It also shows why
the third response to the apparent multiple realization of the closure of the critical
period is unsatisfactory. That response tries to equate the closure of the critical period
with a decline in neural plasticity or connectivity, but I have argued that such a decline
may not correspond to the closure of the critical period in other ontogenetic contexts.
The claim that there can be a many-to-many psycho-neural relationship may be
met with the response that neuroscientists can surely make distinctions between neu-
ral mechanisms active early and late in ontogeny. If they are able to distinguish between
mechanisms that subserve the closure of the critical period and those that underwrite
the onset of dementia, they can restore a one-to-one (or at least a one-to-many) rela-
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tionship between the psychological and the neural. To be sure, neuroscientists can
easily distinguish different manifestations of this process, but if they do so on the
basis of ontogenetic or phylogenetic criteria they are no longer investigating neural
mechanisms as such, but their relation to the organism’s lifespan or their evolution-
ary history. When it comes to the properties of the neural mechanisms themselves,
assuming that they do not differ in terms of the types of entities that constitute them
and the types of activities that they undergo, there is no reason to make a distinction.
Neuroscientists are surely not oblivious of the lifespan of the individual organism or
of the distal causes of the phenomena that they study, but the question is whether
they should consider mechanisms to belong to different kinds if they differ only in
their place in ontogenetic development or phylogenetic origin. There seem to be no
grounds for them to individuate neural mechanisms differently or classify them into
different kinds based on such factors if they are otherwise identical. The claim is not
that neuroscience is incapable of making such distinctions, but that the scientific divi-
sion of labor is such that different sciences attend to different causal processes and
that the distal origins of neural mechanisms and their extra-organismic environment
is not ordinarily a subject of investigation for neuroscience.
4 Objections and replies
The claim that the psycho-neural relationship can be many-to-many (rather one-to-
many or one-to-one) has not been sufficiently explored (much less advocated) by
philosophers and cognitive scientists, and there are a number of objections that can be
raised against it. In this section, I will consider a few of these objections, arguing that
none of them is persuasive.
Metaphysically speaking, there may appear to be a fundamental problem with the
claim that there can be psychological difference without neural difference, since it
seems to violate the principle of supervenience. If we understand this principle as
saying (roughly) that there can be no psychological difference without neural differ-
ence, then it seems to be breached by the example developed in the previous section,
because I have claimed that different types of psychological phenomena can be corre-
lated with the same type of neural mechanism. But the psychological phenomena are
distinguished on the basis of other non-neural (and non-psychological facts), such as
developmental facts or facts about evolutionary history. The psychological differences
supervene upon non-psychological facts, not all of which are neural. Even though a
certain type of local psycho-neural supervenience is contravened, global psychophysi-
cal supervenience is preserved. Hence, there is no mystery as to why the very same type
of neural mechanism could correspond to different types of psychological phenomena
in different contexts.
The idea that the psychological or cognitive kind critical period is individuated in
part relationally or extrinsically may lead to a second objection, to the effect that this
discussion assumes that all neural kinds are intrinsic and all psychological or cogni-
tive kinds are extrinsic. But no such claim is being made, just that some neural kinds
are identified without reference to a broader environmental and etiological context,
while some (correlated) cognitive kinds are at least partly identified in this manner,
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and that is what blocks a type correspondence between them. The critical period is
interesting because it shows how this can obtain in the case of a category central to
research in cognitive science. A follow-up objection could be raised here, to the effect
that intrinsic individuation (or individualism) is a basic principle of individuation in
the sciences and that scientists never appeal to extrinsic or relational properties, which
are causally inert.5 But this principle, which has been endorsed by some philoso-
phers, is not widely accepted in the sciences, especially the special sciences where
individuation according to relational or extrinsic properties, including historical or
etiological properties, is commonplace. Phylogenetic taxonomy is largely etiological
and biological categories are often characterized by “homology thinking,” which is
based on historical descent or etiology (Ereshefsky 2007; Brigandt 2007). Moreover,
there are other bona fide scientific kinds outside biology that are distinguished, at least
in part, on the basis of relational or etiological properties (e.g. meteor, igneous rock).
In the case of psychological taxonomy, as in these other cases, there are often good
grounds for individuating kinds on the basis of relational properties, since whether or
not a cognitive capacity is subject to a critical period influences survival and adap-
tive advantage, and this makes a causal difference to the continued existence of the
organism and the species.6
A third objection to the claim that there can be a many-to-many psycho-neural
relationship would deny that there is a unitary psychological kind, critical period.
As already mentioned in Sect. 2 (see the second response to multiple realization), a
reductionist might insist that there is no reason to gather together these diverse neural
phenomena into a single category. Strictly speaking, such a response is eliminativist
rather than reductionist, since it maintains that there is no single psychological kind,
just a set of distinct neural kinds, which should not be lumped together. The objection
might add that the construct of a critical period is a vestige of a pre-scientific account
of the mind and will wither away as research advances. In response, it is impossible
to anticipate which scientific categories are liable to endure and which will be aban-
doned as more is known about the mind-brain. Suffice it to say that the category critical
period continues to play a prominent role in the cognitive sciences and research into
it is conducted by a number of sub-disciplines. Moreover, it plays an important role in
explanations in evolutionary psychology, cognitive ethology, and related fields, where
researchers address questions such as why birdsong is subject to a critical period in
some species and not in others, or why there should be a critical period for language
in humans and song in some bird species. For these purposes, it is largely irrelevant
whether the neural underpinnings of a critical period are the same. What matters is
the selective advantage (or lack thereof) of having a perceptual or cognitive capac-
ity subject to a critical period. Clearly, it makes a difference to selection whether a
psychological capacity is acquired early or late in development, since early acqui-
sition can make the difference between survival and non-survival. Similar selection
5 Fodor thinks that individualism “is a constitutive principle of science” (1987, p. 45) and claims that planet
is not a scientific kind since it is individuated relationally. But planets have properties (e.g. life-supporting
features) that they would not have if they were just rocks hurtling through space.
6 For a discussion of some of the selection pressures that would favor the emergence of critical periods in
different species and for different capacities, see Immelmann and Suomi (1981).
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Fig. 2 The same psychological phenomenon, 1, can be multiply realized in different neural mechanisms,
ϕ1 and ϕ2. But additionally, the same neural mechanism ϕ1 can correspond to different psychological
phenomena, 1 and 2, depending on different extrinsic factors, E1 and E2
pressures may give rise to the instantiation of critical periods for different psycholog-
ical capacities and in different species, and these may be underwritten by different
neural mechanisms. The resultant picture of the relationship between psychological
capacities and neural mechanisms is one in which the very same type of psycholog-
ical process may be underpinned by different types of neural mechanism (multiple
realization) and the same type of neural mechanism may also correlate with different
types of psychological process. This yields a crosscutting relationship between neural
and psychological kinds (see Fig. 2).
5 Conclusion
I have argued that when it comes to at least one psychological construct, the critical
period, instead of a one-to-one or even a one-to-many relationship between psycho-
logical and neural kinds, we have a many-to-many relationship. Not only does the
critical period lend itself conceptually to such a relationship, there is also some empir-
ical evidence that there are different neural mechanisms involved in the closure of
the critical period, and also that some of these same mechanisms subserve entirely
different psychological constructs. If the closure of the critical period bears a many-
to-many relationship to its neural correlates, this would block a type reduction of this
psychological construct. Hence, the existence of neural correlates does not necessar-
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ily imply a relationship of reduction between the psychological and neural domains.
Reduction is blocked primarily because of the fact that this psychological kind is partly
individuated based on etiology and the broader environmental context, whereas the
neural mechanisms correlated with it are not so individuated. As long as such a rela-
tionship obtains, there will not just be multiple realization among psychological and
neural kinds, but crosscutting among these kinds. It is an open question as to whether
this outcome is commonly attested for other psychological and neural kinds, but it
is likely that there are other psychological kinds that are (partly) individuated with
reference to etiology and broader contextual factors, whereas neural mechanisms are
typically not individuated in this manner.7 More work needs to be done to ascertain
whether a similar relationship obtains between other psychological kinds and their
neural correlates.8
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